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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE GREAT LAKES REGION (IC/GLR):
INCEPTION, PROCESS AND ACHIEVEMENTS
Richard SEZIBERA
Abstract: The Nairobi Pact of October 15th, 2006 on Security, Stability and Development in the Great
Lakes Region is achieved through long effort and process in the framework of the International
Conference on the Great Lakes Region. This paper attempts to highlight the conditions of its inception
and formulation process. However, in order to go beyond the achievements in policy formulations, the
International Conference on the Great Lakes F.?egion requires a great commitment of leaders and peoples
of the region as well as the international solidarity.
Sommaire: Le Pacte de Nairobi du 15 octobre 2006 sur Ia Securite, Ia Stabilite et /e Developpement en
Afrique des Grands Lacs constitue un aboutissement d'efforts et d'un long processus realises dans /e
cadre de Ia Conference lnternationa/e sur Ia Region des Grands Lacs. Get article tente d'e/ucider /es
peripeties ayant accompagne Ia conception et Ia formulation dudit pacte. Seulement, pour qu'elle puisse
al/er au-de/a des resultats atteints au niveau de Ia formulation des politiques, Ia Conference
lnternationale sur Ia Region des Grands Lacs requiert un ferme engagement des leaders et des peup/es
des Etats membres ainsi que de Ia solidarite internationa/e.

1. Introduction

On the 15th of December 2006, in Nairobi Kenya, Heads of State and Governments of
the core Countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 1
appended their signatures to the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the
Great Lakes Region.2The signature of this document was a momentous event for the
peace agenda. It was an important milestone in the search for peace and stability in the
region. It marked the triumph of hope over pessimism, struck a delicate balance
between pragmatism and idealism, and was a well crafted consensus that sought to
move beyond the quagmire of the region's most recent conflict-ridden history and dared
to imagine a future in which the enemies of yesterday worked together to rebuild the ·
region , and lay the ground for sustainable peace and development.

1

The core countries of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region are the following: Angola,
Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya,
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. Some of the neighbors of these core countries are
considered as Co-opted Countries. A number of other countries and organizations are observers
2 The Dar es Salaam Declaration, the Protocols, the Programmes of Action, the Regional Follow up
Mechanism and the Fund constitute integral parts of the Pact.
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The agreements reached were novel in that their design involved the people of the
Great Lakes region . Civil society groups, women, the youth, parliamentarians, religious
leaders, the disabled, media practitioners, and others, all took part in the lengthy
process that led to the signing of the Dares Salaam Declaration in November 2004, and
the Pact on Stability and Development in 2006. As a matter of fact, it is interesting to
note that the Official Rwanda delegation to both the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi
Summits contained more civil society3 delegates than government officials. This was a
result of very close collaboration between the different sectors of Rwandan society
during the preparatory process of the ICGLR. Rwanda had held the first nation- wide
consultations for women, youth and civil society on the process in the region .
Furthermore, Rwandan delegates insisted that these important stakeholders be brought
to the negotiations table as full members of their nations' delegations, instead of being
kept out of the room where important decisions were being made in the guise of parallel
specialized conferences that sometimes produce more fury and thunder than decisions
which can be implemented.
Once the decision was taken to fully include them, the Pact inevitably acquired
invaluable buy in from important segments of the Great Lakes population . That this
came to be was neither inevitable, nor fore ordained. It was a result of sustained political
commitment and will from a broad array of actors. Success in implementation will
require the continued collaborative actions of the broad coalitions that brought it into
being .

3 I use

the term civil society to include all those members who were not functionaries of the government of
Rwanda. The debate about who is or who is not a member of civil society has not yet been concluded in
Rwanda at the time of writing this article. For example, the delegation included religious leaders, who still
insisted they were not members of civil society as defined under the law, and had proposed a separate
legal status for them under Rwandan law. At the regional level, the process almost ground to a halt over
the definition to give to these groups. The standard term "non state actors" carried unacceptable
connotations in the Great Lakes Region. The LUSAKA Ceasefire Agreement of 1999 that was the basis
for ending the armed conflict in the DRC equated non state actors to negative forces, meaning the
murderous and sometimes genocidal armed groups operating within the region. Given the fact that some
of these groups. especially the FDLR, wanted to position themselves as key actors in the process, it was
necessary to send a very clear message to them from the outset that they would not be welcome to
participate in, or derail the process. This was the basis for the acrimonious debate on the term" non state
actors" by the National Coordinators.
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2. Inception of IC/ GLR

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region had confused and unclear
beginnings. Security Council Resolution 1078 (1996) on the situation on the Great
Lakes Region, adopted by the Security Council at its 371 Qth meeting on November
1996,4 one of the many Security Council Resolutions that mentioned it, underlined the
urgent need for'an International Conference on Peace, Security and Development in the
Great Lakes Region under the auspices of the United Nations and the OAU to address
problems of the region in a comprehensive way. However, the problems scheduled for
address by the said resolution were multiple and confusing. The Council was concerned
at the effects of the continued fighting In eastern ROC on the inhabitants of the region,
so, it sought to find a solution for the large scale movement of refugees and internally
displaced persons, it wanted to facilitate the return of humanitarian agenciess to the
region , and enable them to provide humanitarian assistance promptly and safely, it
aimed to create safe corridors and temporary sanctuaries by deploying a neutral force,
and it insisted that the orderly and voluntary repatriation of refugees and return of
internally displaced persons were crucial elements to the stability of the region.
The solution to all these problems was to call for an immediate cessation of hostilities
between the rebellion and the Mobutu regime and push for dialogue between all the
parties to the conflict. The Council also reaffirmed its commitment to the establishment
of conditions conducive to the voluntary repatriation of refugees to their countries of
origin and requested the Secretary General "to seek the cooperation of the Republic of
Rwanda in, and to ensure the international support for, further measures, including the

4 I quote this resolution in some details because it brought to the fore competing interests of members of
the Security Council. The idea of an International Conference, or a Regional Conference on the Great
Lakes had been mooted on a number of international meetings on the region, especially by
representatives of France, and had been mentioned in a number of prior resolutions . For example
Security Council Resolution 997 (1995) adopted by the Security Council at its 3542ndmeeting of June 995
reaffirmed , inter alia, the need for a long term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great
Lakes Region and welcomed the intention of the Secretary General to appoint a special envoy to carry
out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional
Conference on Security, Stability, and Development. In a number of meetings, the idea was fronted that
Rwandan refugees would only return to Rwanda if there were negotiations between the government and
members of the former government which had planed and executed the genocide. The post genocide
government, established in the spirit of the Arusha Agreement was deemed not sufficiently representative
because it did not contain members of the "Hutu power" wing of the Rwandan political spectrum .
5 A number of humanitarian agencies which were concerned that the refugee camps in Eastern ROC had
become thinly veiled military camps for the government and forces that had committed genocide in
Rwanda, and were rearming and reorganizing for more battle, chose to pull out of the camps altogether.
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deployment of additional international monitors, as appropriate, to build confidence and
ensure a safe return of refugees."
This might be considered the crux of the disagreement between the government of
Rwanda and some of the permanent members of the Security Council. They had failed
to correctly diagnose the genocide in 1994, and seemed not to have learnt the lesson in
1996. They insisted the refugee crisis in Eastern Zaire was a result of a "lack of
confidence" by the refugees in the Rwandan government that required international
monitors to build . Rwanda pointed out that the problem was not lack of confidence in the
government, but the fact that millions 6 were being held hostage by the forces of
genocide. Unless the stranglehold these forces held on the refugees was broken,
Rwanda argued, all other envisaged solutions would prove to be a chimera. In this
context it was totally unclear what .an International Conference on the Great Lakes
Region would discuss, let alone solve.
Significant preparatory work was carried out between 1997 when Ambassador Berhanu
DINKA was appointed as the Secretary General's Special Representative and Regional
Humanitarian Adviser to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening of the
Conference and June 20003 when Ambassador lbrahima FALL convened the first
meeting of National Coordinators in Nairobi Kenya. The United Nations and its
Setxetary General faced the difficult task of translating what was an unclear concept in
the service of differing , and sometimes mutually exclusive objectives within the club of
inftuential members of the Security Council into an operational process.
First of all, from a regional point of view, it was important to determine who would be in
the lead of organizing such a Conference. This was not as easy a matter as it may
sound. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its subsequent spill over effects into
neighboring countries, mainly the DRC fundamentally changed the regional geestrategic tectonic plates. The post genocide government in Rwanda was assertive, knew

6

It is unclear how many Rwandan refugees were in Eastern Zaire, so I use "millions" guardedly. No
census was carried out because the genocidal forces torpedoed all attempts to carry one out. At some
point for example, it was estimated that Goma had 1.i million refugees. Partly on the basis of aerial
photographs taken by the French and American military forces, this figure was revised downward to
850,000 and later on to 740,000. Reports circulating in Geneva and Paris talked of 400,000 in Bukavu.
Yet the HCR estimated 200,000. MSF-France who took the decision to send in a medical team to Bukavu
instead of Goma based on the higher figure believe the figures had been padded up by the Bukavu HCR
office in order to attract attention and resources to a region then competing with Goma for international
media attention. This problem of inflating figures and cooking statistics for political ends continued to be a
problem during the entire conference process.
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its rights, and was determined that genocide would not recur on its watch. The United
Nations however, still saw the region in the prism of its traditions and practices, and was
neither able nor capable of dealing with the fast evolving situation on the ground. Yet,
the aftermath of major international traumas require a re thinking of the pillars of
international relations. From the ashes of the holocaust and the Second World War for
example, a new international order was born. That order found itself unable to handle
the challenges of genocide in the twentieth century. It was far from clear that it would be
able to handle the Great Lakes Region in the post genocide era.
The Organization of African Unity, anchored on a sacrosanct state sovereignty was ill
suited to deal with a criminal state ' bent on the mass murder of a section of its
population. The region itself was not organized enough to handle the problem. The
former colonial masters of the countries of the region were too closely involved in the
recent history to be neutral arbiters. Those well-meaning individuals of international
repute like former President Carter, who stepped into the void, found themselves faced
with intractable and complex geo-strategic power plays. While Rwanda always preferred
an African solution with meaningful international partnerships to our problems, this view
point did not have consensus. At the United Nations, there was no natural lead country
for the region, the way the United Kingdom led on Sierra Leone, or the USA led on
Liberia. The natural candidate was France, and indeed that country always provided the
first draft of all UN Resolutions on the region, but its credibility was in tatters in the
aftermath of the genocide. After extensive consultations, it was decided that the African
Union and the United Nations Organization co-lead the process.
Second, the question of what would be discussed during the International Conference
was not clear from the beginning. The agenda was hazy. As we have already pointed
out, the idea of the Conference was mooted within the context of the conflict and
genocide in Rwanda. By the close of last century, however, the theatre of action had
moved to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Rwandan refugees had returned to
their country of origin en masse once Rwandan forces broke the stranglehold exercised
on them, but the DRC was a theatre for a multi national, multi pronged conflict whose
causes are identified in the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999.7 Burundi had also slid
into civil war, and a concerted· regional effort to find a solution to this problem was
7

The Ceasefire Agreement recognized that the confiict in that country had both internal and external
causes. The solution was therefore anchored on four key pillars:
An Inter Congolese Dialogue that would lead to a new political dispensation
Cessation of hostilities
Disarmament of armed groups (negative forces) .
Withdrawal of foreign troops
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underway, led by Uganda as Chair and Tanzania as the Vice Chair of the initiative.
Former Presidents Julius Kambarage Nyerere, Nelson Rohlahla Mandela, and former
Vice President Jacob Zuma of South Africa facilitated the process at different times.
Within this changed context therefore, it would have been ridiculous to hold a
Conference simply aimed at Rwandan refugees as had been the thinking before. The
UN struggled with this issue and consultations continued until there was agreement on
the four thematic areas that are currently the ambit of the Conference, namely: Peace
and Security, Democracy and Good Governance, Economic Affairs and Regional
Integration, and Social and Humanitarian Affairs.
Third, a decision had to be made on the countries that would participate in the
Conference. The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Aid in Rwanda piloted by the Danish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994, considered Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, Uganda and
Tanzania as the Great Lakes Region. This was because the ramifications of the
Rwanda crisis had mainly affected these countries. Although this reasoning made
sense, it would take many months and years of negotiation before the final list of .
countries was agreed on. Originally, Kenya and Zambia were added to the group,
mainly because of the role they had played in the peace processes in the region. One
would have thought that the addition settled the matter, but this was not to be.
Preparations for the Conference stalled for an entire year when the issue of participating
countries was made public. There was talk among some of the organizers of the
Conference that the ultimate outcome of the process would be a Mini-Marshall for the
region . Some countries did not want to miss this perceived bonanza. For others, in
informal settings, the problem was narrowed down to the fact that the seven countries
originally selected were mainly Anglophone. They needed a "Francophone"
counterweight. Indeed, the pressure mounted to the point at which one Security Council
resolution called it an International Conference on Central Africa and the Great Lakes.
Instead of focusing on crises in the Great Lakes Region, some commentators and
prominent officials began to talk about the crisis in Central Africa and the Great Lakes.
The problem with this approach of course was that logically, the Conference would then
have brought in all the countries of the Economic Community of Central African States ,
(ECCAS) .8 This would have enlarged to Conference by eight new members, a situation
that was evidently untenable. Despite this, pressure mounted to include a number of
8

The Economic Community of Central African States consists of eleven Countries namely Angola,
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe.
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countries, especially Angola and the Republic of the Congo. All attempts to have a
logical basis for this enlargement failed . However, during the debate on enlargement, a
consensus emerged that countries neighboring the seven core countries had a
legitimate interest in participating in, and following up on the Conference process,
because the dynamics of conflict in the region have ·affected, in one way or another, the
neighboring countries.
A new category of participants, the co-opted countries, was therefore established,
automatic membership was open to all neighbors of the core countries, thus obviating
the need for application to join . Although the cou,ntries, through their National
Coordinators had reached on consensus on this issue by early 2004, the problem did
not go away. The United Nations representatives were dissatisfied with the consensus,
all attempts at convening meetings to clarify the roles of core countries, co-opted
members, and observers failed , and the Conference process was paralyzed for a long
time.
Eventually, a compromise solution was crafted, proposed by Rwanda, that the Members
of the Great Lakes Conference would be the original Seven, plus those countries
directly affected by, or affecting the conflicts in those countries. This formulation laid a
logical basis for the inclusion of Angola, Central African Republic, Republic of the
Congo, and the Sudan as core countries. As a result however, it widened the field of
potential co opted countries and threatened to turn the ICGLR into a mini African Union
Summit.
Although resolution of this problem allowed for the holding of the first Regional
Preparatory Committee Meeting that was held in Bujumbura, Burundi in August 2004,
the question of the criteria for membership lingered on and reared its head again during
the first Heads of State Summit held in Dar es Salaam on November 24, 2004. The
debate pitted those who thought the Great Lakes Region should be based on
geography, and include countries that border lakes Albert, Edward, Kivu , Tanganyika
and Victoria, and those who thought it should be based on the crises that needed
solving. The latter carried the day. Even with this understanding however, as time went
on , it became clear that there would be a need to divide the region into discrete
geographical areas if the Conference was to design coherent strategies to build
foundations for lasting peace and stability, we will return to this later.
The issues of the rights and obligations of Co-opted Countries was never fully resolved
up to and beyond the second summit. Once the issues of the agenda and the core
countries were finalized , preparations for the Conference could then begin in earnest.
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At a policy level, there was a debate as to the exact timing of the Conference. Many in
the region thought it important that the Conference should not disrupt the peace
processes then underway in Burundi and the DRC. That it should be complementary
too, and not a replacement of those regionally led processes. Some in the international
community, and those dissatisfied with the peace processes wanted an early holding of
the International Conference. Some saw the Conference as a venue in which they
could renegotiate what they felt they had lost in the regional processes. The timing of
the Conference was therefore extremely important if the peace processes were not to
unravel. Once the Burundi Peace process had reached an irreversible stage, and the
DRC process was well on its way, Rwanda then was comfortable to participate in the
Conference.
3. Holding the Conference

Preparations for the International Conference were complicated at structural and policy
levels. At structural level, there was tension between the region's desire for ownership
of the process and the United Nations that had initiated it. The African Union walked a
very delicate line between these two contending visions. The Group of Friends provided
invaluable technical assistance. The National Coordinators played key coordination and
guiding roles . In many ways, they led the process, but their meetings were never fully
structured, with clear rules of procedure. However, decisions were taken always through
consensus. The Joint UN /AU Secretariat were the key facilitator of the process.
Unfortunately, on a number of occasions, the Secretariat's agendas clashed with core
country's desires and this led to temporary paralysis of the preparatory work and
frustrations all around. The main decisions were taken at the Regional Preparatory
Meetings, both at a technical level, and at ministerial level.
These meetings were huge affairs, gathering well over two hundred delegates per
meeting . They were constituted of core country national delegations, delegations from
co opted countries, observer states and organizations, the UN family, and the African
Union. Civil society organizations, women's groups, youth groups, parliamentarians and
others played key roles .
The structure allowed for a fruitful broad exchange of views among key stakeholders in
the region , and allowed for the emergence of personal bonds that eased the process as
time went on. From fear, mistrust, hostility, and conflict, at the beginning , this wide
interaction led to an almost miraculous transformation of the quality of relationships to
one of cooperation, understanding, civility and empathy at the end of the process. The
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fact that the regional meetings rotated among the capitals of the core countries also
increased understanding among the participants.
However, the structure could, at sometimes become unwieldy and hamper decisionmaking. At key moments during the process core countries held closed sessions to
decide on important issues and negotiate and craft delicate understandings that were
not open for renegotiation by the broader Regional Preparatory Committees. The
structure allowed for the mobilization of support from a broad range of International
Partners. On the other hand, care had to be taken not to have it derailed by
disagreements on items propagated by single-issue groups; a constant danger of UN
led processes. At policy level, it became very clear early on during the process, that
there were contending visions that needed decision before the process could move
forward.
The original concept paper prepared by the UN was not satisfactory as a basic
document. Yet, because for so long, the process had been bogged down on procedural
matters, an agreed on concept paper was not developed before the first meeting in
Bujumbura. Rwanda had developed her own forward looking, detailed position paper,
but it was unlikely that this would be accepted as the common template for the
Conference. Many of the ideas contained in the paper were however broadly shared by
most of the core countries, were refined, and became the basis both for the Dar es
Salaam Declaration, and eventually the Pact itself.
There was a clear division between those who wanted the Conference to engage in
debates about the past, apportion blame for it, demand pardon and reparations before
moving forward, and those who thought the region, based on its recent past, should
make the determination to m·ove forward and design programs that would transform the
Great Lakes Region from a region of strife and conflict into a space for shared
prosperity and development. Although the latter carried the day, the former carried out
rear guard actions, and impromptu ambushes all through the process. There was
tension between those who thought the Conference should be country centric and those
who thought it should be problem centric. The former saw the DRC as the key to
stability of the Great Lakes, and wanted, almost exclusively, to address the challenges
that country faces at this moment in history. The latter, while not disputing the
importance of the DRC, wanted to address the pathology of governance that led to the
genocide in Rwanda, continued conflict and instability in the region, and weakened state
structures so deeply that an ideological vacuum was being filled by negative forces with
destructive ideologies.
.,. ·
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This tension continued through the process and the Dares Salaam Declaration and the
Pact on Stability and Development, with its protocols, and plans of action, are carefully
crafted consensus documents that however managed to break new ground in a number
of areas. The regional countries wanted to own the process but lacked the means of
fulfilling their ambition . In practice, as the process continued, drafts were made by
consultants hired by the Joint UN/AU Secretariat. Core countries' experts refined the
drafts of the protocols and programs of action, before the Regional Preparatory
Committee considered them, especially during the second phase of the Conference
process.
On the most controversial issues however, core countries ended up taking the lead on
the documents. This included documents dealing with disarmament of armed groups
operating in eastern DRC, the illegal exploitation of natural resources in the Great Lakes
Region and the Regional Follow Up Mechanism. The contending visions and priorities of
the core countries, single issues groups and international partners continued to
challenge the credibility and functionality of the Conference process. Perhaps the most
glaring example of the contending visions of the Conference was the application of the
FDLR to join the process as an observer. This application almost completely derailed
the process. The Joint UN/AU Secretariat brought the application to the Conference for
a decision, but some in the Secretariat had been working together with this group to
agree on an application that they thought would be acceptable for debate. This
application raised uproar and indignation from Rwanda and other member countries as
expected. It brought to a halt accreditation to observer status, and introduced deep
rancor into the proceedings.
It is difficult to imagine that the Secretariat were unaware of the danger of tabling this
issue. The core countries had agreed that the Conference process would have to deal
with illegal armed groups, and especially genocidal forces - and yet here was the UN
tabling an application for observer status by the most notorious of genocidal groups. It
was as incredible as imagining that the NAZI regime had been invited to Potsdam9 at
the end of the Second World War. The operation could only have had the support of
powerful interests in the international community for the Secretariat to take this risk and
incur general opprobrium. As a matter of fact, for many months, there had been what
looks like a deliberate effort in retrospect, to refuse a discussion on clear processes and

9

The Potsdam Conference was held between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United
Kingdom on July 18 1945. In many ways, it charted the future of Europe. It also clearly was a victors'
conference that did not serve as a template for the ICGLR. The point here is that it would .have been
deeply offensive for anyone to suggest that NAZI Germany be part and parcel of Europe's future .
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procedures for accreditation of observers despite repeated demands by the National
Coordinators that this be done. Because of this rejection of the FDLR by the core
countries in October, on the eve of the Dar es Salaam Summit in November, FDLR
launched rocket attacks on Rwanda. The group seemed to be warning the Heads of
State that unless they were associated, they would continue to disrupt peace and
security in the region . 10
4. Achievements of the Conference

That the Conference process finally p ~oduced ground breaking documents, namely the
Dares Salaam Declaration, Protocols and Programs of Action as contained in the Pact,
is testimony to the resilience and statesmanship of the members of the Regional
Preparatory Committees. They were able to look beyond narrow partisan interests to the
common goods of the region .
The Conference adopted a Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in Great Lakes
Region. The aim of the Pact is to provide a legal framework governing relations between
Member States to which it applies, implement the Dar es Salaam Declaration, the
Protocols, Programmes of Action , the Regional Follow Up Mechanism, and the Special
Reconstruction Fund, and create conditions for security, stability, and sustainable
development between the Member States.11
This paper does not propose ·to discuss the Pact in detail, but to examine briefly, the
moral, legal, and political issues that underlay its most important protocols.
I, understandably examine the protocols that were the priority of priorities for Rwanda. I
know it was difficult to agree on priorities during the process, and this was inevitable
given the disparate nature of the interests represented . The ten protocols eventually
adopted received widest agreement. The Protocol on Non Aggression and Mutual
Defense in the Great Lakes agreed on the need to renounce the threat or use of force
10

We have already pointed out that for the genocidal forces and members of the former Rwandan
Government in exile, the end point, in lieu of completing the genocide, had always been participation in
post genocide political dispensation in Rwanda. The RDR and successor or allied organizations like the
FDLR have relentlessly pursued this line. Power sharing with these groups is what their international
supporters meant when they asked the government of Rwanda to "build confidence and ensure the safe
return of refugees in dignity." The International Conference on the Great Lakes was seen as a venue for
dialogue with these groups, and an important step in the restoration of their tattered political virginity.
11 Article 2 of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region. The Dar es
Salaam Declaration, the Protocols, the Programmes of Action, the Regional Follow Up Mechanism and
the Fund constitute integral parts of the Pact and all references to it necessarily to all its Integral parts.
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as a means of policy or instrument aimed at settling disagreements or disputes or to
achieve national objectives in the Great Lakes Region. This is in line with the United
Nations Charter and the Constitutive Act of the African Union.
The problem, given the history of the region, was how to deal with the question of armed
groups without automatic recourse to the self defense provisions of the United Nations
Charter.12 The problem was dealt with by, on the one hand, clearly defining aggression
to include acts against a member state in contravention of the relevant provisions of the
Pact by a state, a group of states, an entity of the state, an armed group or any other
external or internal entity, and on the other by detailing the acts of aggression to include,
inter alia, the sending of, or support to armed opposition forces or armed groups or
insurgents onto the territory of other member states, or tolerating the presence on their
territories of armed groups or insurgents engaged in armed conflicts or involved in acts
of violence or subversion against the government of another state.
The States also agreed to cooperate at all levels with a view to disarming and
dismantling existing armed rebel groups and to promote the joint and participatory
management of state and human security on their common borders. If any Member
State fails to comply with the above provisions, an extraordinary summit shall be
convened to consider appropriate action. Debate on the major provisions of this
Protocol pitted those states and individuals who one can consider as supporting the
status quo, that is those who are committed to a rigid defense of state sovereignty and
territorial integrity, and those who advocated for a re appraisal of these principles
especially in light of the genocide and the subsequent responsibility to protect
populations this entailed .
The Member States finally agreed that the interdiction of recourse to threats or the use
of force by Member States, and the commitment to non aggression, did not deter them
from their responsibility to protect populations under threat of genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and grave violations of human rights
committed by a State or on the territory of a State signatory to the Pact. The exercise of
this responsibility to protect was subjected to a collective decision, and notification to the
African Union and the United Nations.13
12

It is not by mere accident that the first substantive preamble provision of the Pact is that the States are
mindful of the need to respect democracy and good governance, the fundamental principles enshrined in
the UN Charter and African Union Constitutive Act, notably territorial integrity, national sovereignty, non
interference and non aggression, prohibition of any Member State from allowing the use of its
territory as a base for aggression or subversion against another Member State( emphasis mine).
13 Protocol on Non Aggression and Mutual Defense in the Great Lakes Region, Article 4 (8).
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The Protocol on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes
and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of discrimination raise important questions
about the exercise of power in the region, and their understanding of the fundamental
origins of the crisis in the region . Some states and members contended that the
pathology of governance in the region characterized, inter alia, by the presence and
propagation of discriminatory ideologies in the region, including the ideology of
genocide, was the fundamental cause of the crisis in the Great Lakes Region. Those
who disputed this considered the lack of absolute respect for territorial integrity,
interference in internal affairs and illegal exploitation of natural resources as the key
issues to address.
Debate on these matters was long and sometimes acrimonious. The Pact is a
consensus document that attempts to reconcile these view points, which still
predominate in the management of the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region. The
Member States committed themselves to refrain from, prevent and punish crimes of
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, to condemn and eliminate all forms
of discrimination and discriminatory practices, to ensure the strict observance of this
undertaking by all national, regional and local public authorities and institutions and to
proscribe all propaganda and all organizations which are inspired by ideas or theories
based on the superiority of a race or a group of people of a particular ethnic origin or
which try to justify or encourage any form of ethnic, religious, racial or gender based
hatred or discrimination.
The Protocol on the Fight Against Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and its
attendant project brought to the fore tensions that it will be wise to keep in mind during
the implementation phase. The first draft prepared by the UN expert was rejected in
toto. It was tendentious, seemed to consider leaders in the region as criminals bent on
simply illegally exploiting resources, and was inspired, in part, on the discredited reports
of the UN Committee of Experts on the DRC.14 The choices were between those who
considered illegal exploitation of resources mainly an external phenomenon in which
rapacious neighbors plundered resource rich countries and those who argued that
exploitation was a result of weak states, incapable of fully benefiting from resources
14 The

UN Panel of Experts on the Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo was established pursuant to a Presidential Statement of the Security
Council on June 2000. Its final report, published in October 2003, was considered so lacking in evidence
and basic justice that the Security Council, in a rare diplomatic slap, extended the Panel's mandate by
four months and directed it to "verify, reinforce, update its earlier findings and revise the annexes attached
to its previous reports with a view to adjusting the lists attached to these reports."
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whose exploitation was capital intensive. This therefore opened the door to lopsided
agreements with multinationals with access to technology and capital, agreements that
were lucrative to the multi nationals and their local associates to the detriment of the
local population .
On the one hand, the problem of illegal exploitation was a regional issue, on the other, it
was international. Some wanted an agreement that by design and/or inference
criminalized trade between the regional countries, and the others wanted a regime in
which increased trade, including trade in natural resources, was encouraged, in a
transparent and legitimate manner. Some wanted a system of monitoring resource
exploitation that was externally based, others wanted one that was regionally based and
managed. The Republic of South Africa was eventually requested to provide an expert
on this matter who led the national experts in designing an appropriate system for the
Great Lakes Reg ion, based on South Africa's experience with the Kimberly Process for
diamonds.
The States Parties reaffirmed the permanent sovereignty of each state over its natural
resources, agreed on the need for harmonized national legislation, transparency,
responsibility, equity, and respect for the environment and human settlement in
resource exploitation, and decided to put in place a regional certification mechanism for
the exploitation, monitoring and verification of natural resources within the Great Lakes
Region . The Protocol on Property Rights of Returning Populations brought to the fore
the tensions between a regional approach to this thorny issue versus a national
approach. An absolutist approach to the issue was rejected in favor of a reaffirmation of
the inviolable right to property for returnees, balanced with the imperative of national
stability especially in the aftermath of deep national traumas and conflicts. Some
member states considered the original draft so inimical to their National Peace and
Reconciliation Processes that they threatened to veto it. Rwanda, made extensive
written amendments that fundamentally changed the thrust and character of the
Protocol.
It was agreed that Member States would adopt principles to ensure that refugees and
internally displaced persons, upon returning to their areas of origin, recover their
property with the assistance of local traditional and administrative authorities, and that
they would create a legal framework for resolving disputes arising from the recovery of
property previously occupied or owned by returning persons. The Protocol on the
Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons broke new ground. Whereas
refugees have ample protection under international agreements, there was consensus
that internally displaced persons do not. The member states of the Conference
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committed to adopt and implement the Guidance Principles on Internal Displacement as
proposed by the United Nations Secretariat. It is hoped that ratification will spur other
countries and regional groupings to domesticate and implement the Principles.
Equally innovative was the Protocol on the Specific Reconstruction and Development
Zone. The Member States agreed to implement an economic development and local
integration process pursuant to the decision in the Dares Salaam Declaration to declare
the Great Lakes Region as a Specific Reconstruction and Development Zone. In
particular they agreed to institute trans border development basins to promote local,
reg ional integration of the border populations, and also established a Special
Reconstruction and Development Fund for the purpose of supporting the
implementation of the Protocols and Programmes of Action.
The concept of the trans border development zones and growth triangles, when
combined with the trans border security zones15, is an innovation worth developing and
investing in. It addresses the gamut of challenges from conflict prevention, conflict
resolution, post conflict development, and shared economic growth at local levels.
Finally, the Pact contains a number of Final Provisions that deal with issues of signature
and ratification, non selectivity and reservations, Deposit and Registration, Entry into
Force, Amendments and Revision and Withdrawal.
Conclusion

The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, despite its contested
beginnings, or perhaps because of it, provides an important building block for the
emerging architecture of peace in the region . The impressive array of protocols and
The Trans border security zones identified are the following: Zone 1 comprises the East of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Uganda and North West of Rwanda. Zone 2 comprises the
North of the United Republic of Tanzania, Southern Uganda and South West Kenya. Zone 3 comprises of
the North East of Uganda, North Western Kenya, and the South East of the Sudan. Zone 4 comprises
North West Uganda, North East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Western Sudan.
Zone 5 comprises the North of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Western Sudan and South
Eastern Central African Republic. Zone 6 consists of the North Western DRC, North Eastern Republic of
the Congo, and South Western part of the Central African Republic. Zone 7 covers North Western
Angola, Western DRC, and Southern part of the Republic of the Congo. Zone 8 consists of North Western
Zambia, Southern DRC and East of Angola. Zone 9 has the Western part of the United Republic of
Tanzania, the South of Burundi, the North of Zambia and Southern DRC. Zone 10 consists of the East of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Burundi and the West of Rwanda. Zone 11 has the North
West of the United Republic of Tanzania, South Western Uganda and Eastern Rwanda. Finally Zone 12
consists of North Western Tanzania, South Eastern Rwanda, and North Eastern Burundi.

15
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projects, in the four thematic areas of the Conference, if implemented, would certainly
turn the area from a region of persistent conflict to an area of shared prosperity and
development.
It establishes and enshrines the twin principles of ownership and international
partnership crucial for post conflict reconstruction and development. A significant
number of its projects will be implemented by, or through close cooperation with,
existing regional economic communities. Its cross cutting nature therefore introduces an
element of synergy with existing groupings without necessarily deepening the tensions
within and between them.
As far as Rwanda is concerned, it fills some of the gaps in attempts to address the
peace, security, and development challenges in a holistic manner. As is well known, the
Economic Community of the Great Lakes( CEPGL), although it registered important
achievements in the past, including in areas of energy, agricultural research, financing
for some integration projects, and circulation of goods, services and labor, was gravely
affected by the deep crisis within its member states. Furthermore, the crisis spread to
involve other non member states including Uganda, Central African Republic, and the
Sudan to mention but a few. Therefore, although post conflict recovery must involve the
revival of this organization, it must of necessity go beyond it.
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has been feeble and
inactive for a number of years. Overshadowed by CEMAC and weakened by conflicts
within some of its most important member states, the organization has been unable to
effectively address the security and development challenges its members face. The
Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin (OBK)
became moribund and was dissolved. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern
Africa (COMESA) is still active. Effective in its Economic integration agenda, it has
struggled to find its role in the peace and security arena.16 The Southern Development
Community (SADC) led by South Africa, has been active in finding solutions to the many
crises that affect the Great Lakes Region.17 In the past however, differing interpretations
of its basic documents caused an internal crisis in the aftermath of the contested
16

COME SA has decided to establish an Early Warning Mechanism that would eventually be part of the
Continental Early Warning Mechanism. However, the Organization , while recognizing that Peace and
Security is a sine qua non for economic development, has struggled to find her place in this important
arena despite Institutionalization of the Standing Committee on Peace and Security.
17 South Africa is the most active African member of the "Group of Friends of the Great Lakes Region".
This Group, co- Chaired by Canada and the Kingdom of the Netherlands was key in raising political,
diplomatic. and financial support for the Preparatory phase of the Conference process.
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intervention of some of its members, in the name of the Organization, in the conflict in
the DRC.
The interplay between weak or weakened states, timid and sometimes uncoordinated
regional interventions, differing interests and agendas by international powers and
marginalized populations produces the crisis of security, governance and development
the Great Lakes Region currently faces. The process of the International Conference on
the Great Lakes Region brought all these important actors together to chart a blue print
for the future of the region . The fruit of their labor is wide, optimistic, and in some cases
breaks new ground. Whether this will remain on paper, another mirage of the kind the
region has known so often in the past, or whether it will truly serve as a new direction to
a future of hope and prosperity for all will, to a large extent, depend on the strength of
the partnerships forged during its preparatory phase. It will also require visionary
reg ional and international leadership, as a well as a determination by civil society
broadly defined, to make sure it succeeds.
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